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89 Uhland Street
East Rutherford, NJ 07073
Appellant, pro se
Gary S. Lipshutz, Esquire
Emelia Perez, Esquire (argued)
City of Newark, Department of Law
920 Broad Street
Newark, NJ 07102
Counsel for Appellee City of Newark
______________
OPINION
______________
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge
Gregory Meditz (“Meditz”), an attorney proceeding
pro se, appeals from the District Court‟s grant of summary
judgment in favor of the City of Newark (“Newark”) on his
claim of disparate impact and his motion to strike1 an exhibit
1

Before the District Court, Meditz sought to strike a
certification attached to Newark‟s reply brief. The District
Court denied this motion, concluding that the information
contained in the certification was publicly available, that
Meditz was aware of the information, and that the “contents
are unnecessary to decide the present summary judgment
motion, and have in no way altered this Court‟s decision.”
(App. 4.) We review the District Court‟s decision denying
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attached to Newark‟s reply brief. Meditz alleges that the
residency requirement adopted by Newark for its nonuniformed work force has a disparate impact on white, nonHispanics because Newark‟s population does not reflect the
racial make-up of the relevant labor market in the surrounding
area. As a result, white, non-Hispanics are under-represented
in Newark‟s non-uniformed work force. For the reasons set
forth below, we conclude that the grant of summary judgment
on the disparate impact claim was not appropriate based on
this record. We will therefore reverse and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.

Facts/background

In April 2007, Meditz, a white male, applied for the
position of Housing Development Analyst in Newark. He
was rejected in July 2007 because, at the time, he lived in
Rutherford, New Jersey.2
Newark has a residency

the motion to strike for an abuse of discretion. See In re: Fine
Paper Antitrust Litig., 751 F.2d 603, 604 (3d Cir. 1984). “A
district court abuses its discretion if its decision rests upon a
clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law
or an improper application of law to fact.” Johnston v. HBO
Film Management, Inc., 265 F.3d 178, 183 (3d Cir. 2001).
We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the motion to strike since we find no
clearly erroneous finding of fact, errant conclusion of law, or
improper application of law to fact.
2

Meditz now lives in East Rutherford, New Jersey.

3

requirement for non-uniformed employees.3 In light of the
3

Newark‟s ordinance setting forth its residency
requirements provides that:
All officers and employees of the City
who shall hereafter become employees of the
City are hereby required as a condition of their
continued employment to have their place of
abode in the City and to be bona fide residents
therein, except as otherwise provided by the
Charter. A bona fide resident, for the purpose
of this section, is a person having a permanent
domicile within the City and one which has not
been adopted with the intention of again taking
up or claiming a previous residence acquired
outside of the City limits.
The Director of any Department or the
Mayor or City Clerk is hereby authorized in
his/her discretion, for good cause shown, to
permit any officer or employee of the City in
his/her respective department or office to
remain in the employ of the City without
complying with the provisions hereof, where:
a. The health of any officer or
employee necessitated residence outside of the
City limits;
b. The nature of the employment
is such as to require residence outside of the
City limits;
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waiver provisions in the ordinance, 185 non-uniformed
employees4 reside outside of Newark, in 825 different
municipalities, including some in other states. Uniformed
employees must reside in Newark during their preliminary
training, but then can move out of the city.
In support of his prima facie case, Meditz provided
detailed statistical information in opposition to Newark‟s
motion for summary judgment.
Meditz obtained the

c. Special talent or technique
which is necessary for the operation of
government not found among Newark residents
exists justifying residence outside of the City
limits;
Failure of any officer or employee to
comply with this section shall be cause for
his/her removal or discharge from the City
service.
NEWARK, N.J. REV. ORDINANCES § 2:24-1.1.
4

Newark has 4,316 employees, of which 1,949 are
non-uniformed and 2,367 are uniformed. Currently, 185 nonuniformed employees reside outside the city and 805
uniformed employees reside outside the city.
5

The parties disagree as to the number of different
municipalities in which Newark employees live. This
difference is not material to the underlying issues in this case.

5

statistical information from publicly available reports.
Newark does not dispute the validity of any of the statistics
Meditz presented. These statistics compared the ethnic
distribution of non-uniformed employees to the ethnic makeup of Newark.6 Meditz argued that the difference between the
percentages of white, non-Hispanic non-uniformed and
uniformed employees was based on the residency requirement
for non-uniformed employees. That is, Meditz posited that
the residency requirement for non-uniformed employees was
negatively impacting the hiring of white, non-Hispanics.
Newark argues that the statistics presented by Meditz
do not support his prima facie case, since “the statistical
disparities are not sufficiently substantial as to show that the
residency ordinance has caused whites of non-Hispanic origin
to be excluded from jobs with [Newark] because of their
race.” (Br. of Def.-Appellee City of Newark 10.)
Alleging that the relevant labor market was the six
county area surrounding Newark, Meditz also provided the
ethnic breakdown of the general population in the
surrounding counties, all of which included higher
percentages of white, non-Hispanics than were employed as
non-uniformed employees in Newark.7 He included more
6

In 2007, 9.24% of the non-uniformed employees in
Newark were white, non-Hispanic, while 28.31% of the
uniformed employees were white, non-Hispanic. According
to the 2000 census data, 14.2% of Newark‟s general
population is white, non-Hispanic.
7

The six counties Meditz examined were Bergen,
Essex, Hudson, Morris, Passaic, and Union. Based on the
2000 census data, the percentage of white, non-Hispanics in

6

specific data addressing the ethnic composition of
government employees8 and the private labor force9 in each
of the surrounding counties. The percentage of white, nonHispanics in these positions greatly exceeded the number of
white, non-Hispanics in Newark‟s non-uniformed work force.
Meditz also provided employment statistics for Essex County
governmental employees. Essex County has its county seat in
Newark, and the composition of the Essex County and
Newark non-uniformed workforces are comparable with
regard to skill level and job function. Of the non-uniformed
county workforce, 42.96% is white, non-Hispanic, according
to the 2008 EEO-4 report. Meditz argued that the lower
Bergen County‟s general population is 72.3%; in Essex
County‟s general population is 37.6%; in Hudson County‟s
general population is 35.3%; in Morris County‟s general
population is 82.0%; in Passaic County‟s general population
is 51.5%; and in Union County‟s general population is 54.2%.
8

Based on data gathered from 2005 Equal
Employment Opportunity reports, the percentage of white,
non-Hispanic government employees in Bergen County is
86.49%; in Essex County is 48.09%; in Hudson County is
48.09%; in Morris County is 84.37%; in Passaic County is
56.3%; and in Union County is 66.2%.
9

Based on data gathered from 2005 Equal
Employment Opportunity reports, the percentage of white,
non-Hispanic employees in the private labor force in Bergen
County is 55.18%; in Essex County is 46.05%; in Hudson
County is 43.05%; in Morris County is 65.77%; in Passaic
County is 50.24%; and in Union County is 53.31%.
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percentage of white, non-Hispanic non-uniformed employees
in Newark was caused by the residency requirement, and that
absent a residency requirement, significantly more white,
non-Hispanics would be employed by Newark. As a result,
Meditz concluded that Newark‟s residency requirement
disparately impacted him as a white, non-Hispanic who was
denied a job with Newark.
The District Court granted Newark‟s motion for
summary judgment, concluding that Meditz failed to prove
his prima facie case. That is, based on the statistical evidence
Meditz presented, the District Court concluded that “these
statistics, standing alone, do not constitute sufficient evidence
of a significantly discriminatory hiring pattern.” In re Meditz
v. City of Newark, No. 08-2912, 2010 WL 1529612, at *3
(D.N.J. Apr. 15, 2010). The District Court further concluded
that there was no need to look beyond Newark‟s borders to
define the relevant labor market, since “Newark is New
Jersey‟s largest city with over 270,000 residents, 38,950 of
whom are White. Given its diversity and large population,
there is no need to redefine the relevant labor market past city
limits for purposes of Title VII analysis.” Id. at *4. We
disagree with both conclusions of the District Court.
II.

Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331; we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 10

10

Meditz‟s Third Amended Complaint asserts seven
counts. He avers constitutional claims, pursuant to both the
federal and state constitutions, as well as a claim of disparate
treatment. Meditz does not appeal the District Court‟s

8

We review the District Court‟s order granting
summary judgment de novo. Azur v. Chase Bank, USA, Nat‟l
Ass‟n, 601 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2010). ATo that end, we are
required to apply the same test the district court should have
utilized initially.@ Chambers ex rel. Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of
Phila. Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 181 (3d Cir. 2009)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Summary judgment is appropriate Awhere the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions,
and affidavits show there is no genuine issue of material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.@ Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805-06 (3d Cir.
decision granting summary judgment on those claims.
Additionally, the Third Amended Complaint included claims
made pursuant to New Jersey‟s Open Public Records Act and
the common law right to access to public records (counts 6
and 7). Newark did not seek summary judgment on these
claims. In its opinion, the District Court noted that it
appeared that Meditz obtained the records he sought.
However, the District Court did not dismiss these claims as
moot. While both parties treated the District Court‟s order as
final, the failure to address all counts of the complaint causes
us to question the finality of the District Court‟s order, and
thus our jurisdiction. However, our review of the entire
record assures us that the records referenced in counts 6 and 7
of the Third Amended Complaint were, in fact, provided to
Meditz, since several of his exhibits cite those records, thus
rendering those claims moot. Ultimately, the failure to
address counts 6 and 7 does not undermine either the District
Court‟s ruling or our jurisdiction.

9

2000) (en banc) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).11 AOnce the
moving party points to evidence demonstrating no issue of
material fact exists, the non-moving party has the duty to set
forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material
fact exists and that a reasonable factfinder could rule in its
favor.@ Azur, 601 F.3d at 216. In determining whether
summary judgment is warranted A[t]he evidence of the
nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are
to be drawn in his favor.@ Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Chambers ex rel. Chambers, 587
F.3d at 181. AFurther, „[w]e may affirm the District Court‟s
order granting summary judgment on any grounds supported
by the record.‟@ Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186 (3d
Cir. 2009) (quoting Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d at 805).
III.

Analysis

Meditz claims that Newark‟s residency requirement
for non-uniformed employees has a disparate impact on
white, non-Hispanics in violation of Title VII. In support of
his claim, he cites evidence of the relatively low percentage
of white, non-Hispanics in Newark‟s non-uniformed work
force. The statistics he provides demonstrate that the
percentage of white, non-Hispanics in Newark‟s nonuniformed work force is lower than the percentage that would
be anticipated based on the percentage of white, non11

FED. R. CIV. P. 56 was revised in 2010. The
standard previously set forth in subsection (c) is now codified
as subsection (a). The language of this subsection is
unchanged, except for “one word — genuine „issue‟ bec[ame]
genuine „dispute.‟” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee‟s
note, 2010 amend.

10

Hispanics in the population of the relevant labor market.
Title VII makes it unlawful “to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual‟s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The Supreme Court has long
recognized that Title VII plaintiffs can make out a viable
employment discrimination claim without alleging or proving
discriminatory intent. See Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S.
424 (1971). Under Title VII, “practices, procedures, or tests
neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent,
cannot be maintained if they operate to „freeze‟ the status quo
of prior discriminatory employment practices.” Griggs, 401
U.S. at 430.
“The [Supreme] Court announced that these „disparate
impact‟ cases should proceed in two steps: (1) the plaintiff
must prove that the challenged policy discriminates against
members of a protected class, and then (2) the defendant can
overcome the showing of disparate impact by proving a
„manifest relationship‟ between the policy and job
performance. This second step came to be known as the
„business necessity‟ defense, and it serves as an employer‟s
only means of defeating a Title VII claim when its
employment policy has a discriminatory effect.” El v.
SEPTA, 479 F.3d 232, 239-40 (3d Cir. 2007) (footnotes
omitted.)
“[T]he successful assertion of the business
necessity defense is not an ironclad shield; rather, the plaintiff
can overcome it by showing that an alternative policy exists
that would serve the employer‟s legitimate goals as well as
the challenged policy with less of a discriminatory effect.”
Id. at 240 n.9.
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Thus, “[i]n order to establish a prima facie case of
disparate impact discrimination, a plaintiff is required to
demonstrate that application of a facially neutral standard has
resulted in a significantly discriminatory hiring pattern.”
N.A.A.C.P. v. Harrison, 940 F.2d 792, 798 (3d Cir. 1991)
(citing Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977)).
“The evidence in these „disparate impact‟ cases usually
focuses on statistical disparities.” Watson v. Fort Worth Bank
and Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988).
“A comparison
between the racial composition of those qualified persons in
the relevant labor market and that of those in the jobs at issue
typically „forms the proper basis for the initial inquiry in a
disparate impact case.‟” Harrison, 940 F.2d at 798 (quoting
Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 65051(1989) (superceded by statute on other grounds)).
The Supreme Court has noted in several cases that
statistics may serve to establish plaintiff‟s prima facie case.
See, e.g., Watson, 487 U.S. at 991-95; Hazelwood School
Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S 299 (1977). That is, “[w]here
gross statistical disparities can be shown, they alone may in a
proper case constitute prima facie proof of a pattern or
practice of discrimination.” Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 307-08.
But, “[o]nce the employment practice at issue has been
identified, causation must be proved; that is, the plaintiff must
offer statistical evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to
show that the practice in question has caused the exclusion of
applicants for jobs or promotions because of their
membership in a protected group. Our formulations, which
have never been framed in terms of any rigid mathematical
formula, have consistently stressed that statistical disparities
must be sufficiently substantial that they raise such an
inference of causation.” Watson, 487 U.S. 994-95. See also

12

Green v. USX Corp., 896 F.2d 801, 804 (3d Cir. 1990)
(observing that “[t]he [Supreme] Court held that the plaintiff
may not make out a prima facie discrimination case simply by
showing a bottom line racial imbalance in the work force, or
by identifying a number of allegedly discriminatory
employment practices. Instead, the plaintiff must
„demonstrate that the [racial] disparity . . . is the result of one
or more of the employment practices that they are attacking
. . ., specifically showing that each challenged practice has a
significantly disparate impact on employment opportunities
for whites and nonwhites.‟” (quoting Wards Cove, 490 U.S.
at 657)).
However, a key factor in assessing the statistics is
ensuring that the court is using the correct basis for
comparison. That is, “[w]hat the hiring figures prove
obviously depends upon the figures to which they are
compared.” Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 310.12 To use the
vernacular, we cannot compare apples to oranges. In
Hazelwood, that was essentially what the district court did —
it compared the percentage of minority teachers to the
percentage of minority students, rather than comparing the
12

The Supreme Court commented that there are cases
where comparing the work force to the general population
would be appropriate, such as cases involving unskilled labor.
However, “[w]hen special qualifications are required to fill
particular jobs, comparisons to the general population (rather
than to the smaller group of individuals who possess the
necessary qualifications) may have little probative value.”
Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 308 n.13. See also Green v. USX
Corp., 896 F.2d 801, 804-05 (3d Cir. 1990) (using applicant
flow data for unskilled positions acceptable).
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percentage of minority teachers in the Hazelwood school
district to the percentage of minority teachers in the relevant
labor market. The Supreme Court directed the district court,
on remand, to evaluate the parameters of the appropriate
“relevant labor market,” including whether it should or should
not include the city of St. Louis. The Court, after discussing
statistical methodology, commented that those “observations
are not intended to suggest that precise calculations of
statistical significance are necessary in employing statistical
proof, but merely to highlight the importance of the choice of
the relevant labor market area.” Id. at 311.
Similarly, we have addressed the question of what
constitutes the relevant labor market. In Harrison, the Third
Circuit examined Harrison‟s employment related residency
requirement, and that policy‟s impact on the city‟s ability to
hire minorities. Given that the city of Harrison had a very
small minority population, limiting hiring to city residents
almost assured having no minority employees. However, that
fact alone was insufficient to establish plaintiff‟s prima facie
case.
In Harrison, we approved the District Court‟s
methodology for defining the relevant labor market. The
factors included geographical location, flow of transportation
facilities, locations from which private employers in Harrison
draw their work force, and commuting patterns. 940 F.2d at
799-801.
Here, in support of his prima facie case, Meditz
offered statistical evidence showing that the percentage of
white, non-Hispanics employed by Newark was lower than
the percentage of white, non-Hispanics in the general
population of Newark. Meditz also offered statistics showing
the percentage of white, non-Hispanics in surrounding areas,
both for the general population and for the private and

14

government work forces. Finally, Meditz offered evidence of
the percentage of white, non-Hispanics employed by the
Essex County government in Newark. Out of all of these
percentages, the lowest was the percentage of white, nonHispanics employed by the city of Newark. This compilation
of statistics supported Meditz‟s claim that white, nonHispanics were under-represented in Newark‟s nonuniformed work force.
The Supreme Court has set forth standards to be used
as a basis for evaluating statistical evidence in disparate
impact claims. Relying on the statistical standards developed
in jury analysis cases, the Supreme Court suggested that
“fluctuation of more than two or three standard deviations
would undercut the hypothesis that decisions were being
made randomly with respect to race.” Hazelwood, 433 U.S.
at 311 n.17.13 Assuming for the moment that the District
13

“The measure of the predicted fluctuations from the
expected value is the standard deviation.” Castaneda v.
Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.17. “A standard deviation
analysis would proceed as follows: Creating a jury list would
be similar hypothetically to stocking a shelf with 100 pens
randomly selected from a batch of 1000 pens, 700 of which
are blue and 300 of which are red. The expected number of
blue pens would be 700 x .1 or 70 pens and the expected
number of red pens would be 300 x .1 or 30 pens. However,
there is a certain probability that random selection would
yield a different result. The standard deviation calculation
measures how likely it is that a deviant result occurred by
chance. In the above example, the standard deviation is the
square root of the product of the number of pens shelved
(100) times the probability of drawing a red pen (0.3) times

15

Court was correct and the relevant labor market is the
population of the city of Newark, the difference between the
two percentages is slightly over six standard deviations, far in
excess of the Supreme Court‟s suggested standard of two or
three standard deviations.14 This difference appears to
establish a prima facie case.15

the probability of drawing a blue pen (0.7). Here, that number
is 4.6 pens. Each standard deviation results in a substantially
reduced probability that the result occurred by random
chance. In our example, the probability that 20 red “pens and
80 blue pens would be randomly shelved is less than 5
percent.” Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, 1232 n.17 (3d
Cir. 1992).
14

Using the percentage of white, non-Hispanic
government employees in Essex County results in a
difference of slightly over 34 standard deviations. Our use of
the Essex County government employees figure does not
reflect any view on the composition of the relevant labor
market.
15

“[A] plaintiff must also prove causation. . . . „As a
general matter, a plaintiff must demonstrate that it is the
application of a specific or particular employment practice
that has created the disparate impact under attack. Such a
showing is an integral part of the plaintiff's prima facie case
in a disparate-impact suit under Title VII.‟” N.A.A.C.P. v.
Bayonne, 134 F.3d 113, 124 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Wards
Cove, 490 U.S. at 657). In Bayonne, the court noted that
“[c]ausation presents a question of fact.” Id. at 119. The
District Court never discussed the issue of causation since it
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Despite this statistical evidence, the District Court
concluded that Meditz failed to prove his prima facie case
because the difference between the percentage of white, nonHispanics employed by the city (9.24%) compared to the
percentage of white, non-Hispanics living in the city (14.2%),
did “not constitute sufficient evidence of a significantly
discriminatory hiring pattern.” Meditz, 2010 WL 1529612, at
*3. Given this bald conclusion, it is not clear what
methodology or statistical analysis the District Court
employed. Notably, the District Court made no reference to
the standard deviation analysis recommended by the Supreme
Court.
Before the District Court can reach the statistical
analysis, it must make a determination as to the parameters of
concluded that the statistics did not support Meditz‟s claim.
Here, Meditz is challenging a residency requirement. In such
a case, if the geographic limits of the relevant labor market
are the same as those imposed by the residency requirement,
then comparison between the racial composition of the
relevant labor market and the racial composition of the
employer‟s workforce will not necessarily explain causation.
Any statistically significant disparity between the two
populations most likely will not be the result of the residency
requirement because all members of the relevant labor market
would meet the requirement. Put differently, if every person
that the employer could reasonably recruit (i.e., the relevant
labor market) meets the residency requirement, then the
requirement can have no effect—racial or otherwise—on the
employer‟s hiring. Therefore, comparison to other factors
will be necessary in order to demonstrate causation.
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the relevant labor market. See Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 313.
In conducting this analysis, the District Court should consider
the factors set forth in Harrison, including geographical
location, flow of transportation facilities, locations from
which private employers draw their workforce, and
commuting patterns.16 Harrison, 940 F.2d at 799-801.
In Harrison, this Court concluded that the factors
considered by the district court in determining what
geographical area constituted the relevant labor market were
reasonable. 940 F.2d at 801. The District Court here focused
on the fact that the population of Harrison, at the time of this
Court‟s decision in that case, included few blacks, and
Harrison employed no blacks. By comparison, according to
the District Court here, the fact that Newark employed 180
16

In support of his proposed definition of the relevant
labor market, Meditz offered his own affidavit stating that the
“City of Newark is within reasonable commuting distance to
Essex, Bergen, Hudson, Union, Morris & Passaic counties,”
and that his current residence, East Rutherford, was only
seven miles from the City of Newark. Additionally, he
offered employment data obtained from Newark, which
showed that, due to waivers of the residency requirement, 185
of Newark‟s 1,949 non-uniformed employees resided outside
of the City of Newark. Finally, the government of the County
of Essex—an employer similar in many respects to the City
of Newark—has an office in Newark but does not require its
employees to be residents of Newark. Newark has not
contested any of these factual assertions. This evidence
strongly suggests that the relevant labor market is not limited
to the City of Newark.
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white, non-Hispanics, far more than Harrison‟s employment
of zero blacks, sufficed to demonstrate a lack of
discrimination.
The District Court misinterpreted Harrison. Rather
than reading Harrison as setting forth appropriate criteria to
consider in determining the relevant labor market, the District
Court read Harrison to stand for the proposition that the only
reason to look outside the city limits is a lack of minorities
within the city.
We will remand so that the District Court can
determine the relevant labor market, relying on the criteria set
forth in Harrison, and then conduct a complete and correct
statistical analysis,17 comparing the makeup of Newark‟s nonuniformed labor force with the similarly skilled labor force in
the relevant labor market.
To the extent the District Court concluded that, even if
Meditz established a prima facie claim of disparate impact,
Newark is still entitled to summary judgment because the city
has met the requirements of the business necessity defense,
we further reverse the Court on this point. We agree with
Meditz that the District Court applied the incorrect standard.
The District Court focused only on whether the
business justifications offered by Newark had any connection
17

The statistical analysis should include the
calculation of the standard deviation between the number of
white, non-Hispanics employed by Newark, and the number
of white, non-Hispanics in the relevant labor market, rather
than a subjective view of the relative percentages.
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to the residency policy even if unrelated to Meditz‟s ability to
perform the job in question. The District Court mistakenly
relied on this court‟s opinion in Harrison that in turn relied on
the Supreme Court‟s definition of business justification in
Wards Cove. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 abrogated the
decision in Wards Cove, and returned the business necessity
defense to the standard that existed prior to the date of the
decision in Wards Cove. El, 479 F.3d at 241.
Since the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
we have not had the occasion to consider the business
necessity defense in a case involving a challenge to an
employment related residency requirement. However, in El,
we carefully considered the evolution of the business
necessity defense, and concluded “that hiring criteria must
effectively measure the „minimum qualifications for
successful performance of the job in question.‟ This holding
reflects the Griggs/Albemarle/Dothard rejection of criteria
that are overbroad or merely general, unsophisticated
measures of a legitimate job-related quality. It is also
consistent with the fact that Congress continues to call the test
„business necessity,‟ not „business convenience‟ or some
other weaker term.” El, 479 F.3d at 242 (quoting Lanning v.
SEPTA, 181 F.3d 478, 481 (3d Cir. 1999)).
It is this standard, and not the standard set forth in
Harrison, that the District Court must address on remand. We
note that even under the “diluted”18 business necessity
18

“Although Wards Cove arguably diluted the
business necessity burden imposed upon the defendant under
prior case law, it did not reduce the defendant‟s burden to a
showing of mere rationality. While it is now clear that the
employer need not show that a challenged practice is
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defense applied in Harrison, this Court found the reasons
proffered by the city of Harrison to be “insubstantial” and not
“supported by objective evidence demonstrating a nexus
between [the] residency ordinance and any specific
employment goal.” Harrison, 940 F.2d at 805. The business
necessities we rejected in Harrison are strikingly similar to
the justifications offered by Newark here. Unlike the city of
Harrison, which offered testimony in support of its business
necessity defense, Newark provides scant support or
explanation for its proffered business necessities. On remand,
if the District Court reaches the question of business
necessity, it should analyze the evidence offered by Newark
in support of its position, and not simply conclude that “[t]his
Court is satisfied that Defendant has objectively demonstrated
a nexus between its residency ordinance and its employment
goals.” Meditz, 2010 WL 1529612, at *4.
IV.

Conclusion

Based upon our de novo review, we conclude that
summary judgment was not appropriate on this record.
Factual issues exist as to how to define the appropriate
relevant labor market. Even if the city of Newark itself is the
relevant labor market, the District Court erred in its statistical
analysis. Further, the District Court applied the incorrect
standard when analyzing the business necessity defense. On
remand, the correct standard should be considered. We will
remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

absolutely necessary, it must demonstrate that the practice
furthers legitimate business goals.” Harrison, 940 F.2d at 803
(citations omitted, emphasis in original).
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